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Abstract
In this paper we intend to connect two different strands of research concerning
the origin of what I shall loosely call “formal” ideas: firstly, the relation between
logic and rhetoric - the theme of the 2006 Cambridge conference to which this
paper was a contribution -, and secondly, the impact of religious convictions on
the formation of certain twentieth century mathematical concepts, as brought
to the attention recently by the work of L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor. In fact,
we shall show that the latter question is a special case of the former, and that
investigation of the larger question adds to our understanding of the smaller
one. Our approach will be primarily historical.
Introduction
Let us start with an outline of the issues that are at stake. In the conclusion to
their Isis-paper, Graham and Kantor state:
We believe that our study of French and Russian developments in set
theory and the theory of functions points strongly toward the impor-
tance of cultural factors in the process and creation of mathematics
— in the French case, Descartes, positivism, and Pascal; in the Rus-
sian case, mystical religious beliefs, particularly those of the Name
Worshipping movement. As a result the French and the Russians
followed different approaches.3
∗This paper is dedicated to the memory of my father, Emiel Verelst (◦26/12/1934 –
†21/10/2009).
1FUND-CLEA, Dept. of Mathematics.
2Faculty of Cultural Studies.
3L. Graham, J.-M. Kantor, “A comparison of two cultural approaches to mathematics
France and Russia, 1890-1930”, Isis, 97, 1, 2006.
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They immediately add that such “intellectual causation” can never be proved
rigorously, only made plausible, and they are evidently right. But it is equally
evident that this holds true for many phaenomena investigated in, loosely speak-
ing again, cultural studies, without making them any less relevant. Graham and
Kantor also point out that comparative studies add up to more credible evi-
dence, and to this we also agree. Therefore we shall in the present paper enlarge
the comparative scope of their work into the past, and see whether the con-
clusions they reached do still stand. We limit ourselves to the “French” part
of their comparative equation, not only because we possess the linguistic and
historical tools required to do the concerned research properly, but also because
our authors elaborate the French background only little when compared to the
Russian one, probably because they assume it to be “known”. However, when
looked into more deeply, some surprises are bound to turn up! The starting point
for our investigation is fixed by our authors when they say that the French in-
tellectual framework with respect to “rationalism” has been shaped decisively
by Descartes and Pascal. This brings us to the beginnings of the Early Modern
period, a period of cultural, religious and scientific turmoil indeed. It is our in-
tention to show in the following pages that during that period a debate — really
more like an intellectual war — was going on concerning the nature of rhetoric,
and especially memory, in which the different positions involved had fundamen-
tally different theological roots, and lead to different practices in philosophy,
art (in its present-day sense), and science, which are relevant to the Graham-
Kantor thesis. One of the focal points of the debate was the notion of method.
The final victory of one of the intellectual parties in the debate brought about
the destruction of the other methodological approach and stood godmother to
the birth of modern science, in its rationalist outlook advocated by Descartes,
Leibniz and Pascal, in its empirist cloak by Newton and his followers. It is rel-
evant for our concerns that the main characters in the final stage of this heroic
tale gave birth to the kind of mathematics repudiated by the masters of the
later Russian mathematical school, viz., infinitesimal calculus.
With respect to “method”, it is a commonplace in our philosophical tra-
dition that Descartes initiated a new way of doing “natural philosophy” —
for him unquestionably aequivalent to doing science —, by the introduction of
a new method based on “clear ideas” and mathematical reasoning. The title
of his famous book, Discours de la me´thode, brings the point home explicitly.
This literally methodological emphasis framed his approach to natural philos-
ophy from the start, as is clear from the title of his first, but posthumously
published, work Regulae at directionem ingenii (Rules for the Direction of the
Mind).4 This approach became the intellectual program of the period, fostered
not only by Descartes, but also by the famous Port Royal Logic. Arnauld and
Nicole, authors of the Port Royal Logic, call it L’Art de Penser.5 This very in-
4R. Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Texte critique, G. Crapulli (ed.), Martinus
Nijhoff, La Haye, 1966. (This edition is better than the version in Adam et Tannery (vol.
X, p. 362 sq., Cerf, Paris, 1897-1913), because it takes into account the Dutch translations
published after 1680.
5A. Arnauld et P. Nicole, La Logique ou L’Art de Penser, Flammarion, Paris, 1970, [1662].
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fluential and widespread book outlines an anti-Aristotelian conception of logic
based on the study of natural language and on the nature of mathematical de-
ductions (as opposed to merely syllogistic ones), and it states explicitly that the
authors chose their examples in such a way as to introduce the reader to the
correct philosophy of nature, as well as to correct methods for judgment in mat-
ters moral and religious. Arnauld and Nicole heavely stress the importance of
both simplicity and ’good sense’ in judgment, and lay this down in eight ‘Rules’
destined to govern the process of reasoning. These are exemplified in the ‘Qua-
trie`me partie. De la me´thode’, the last part of their book. They furthermore
distinguish carefully between analyse, the method of invention, and synthese,
the method of composition.6 Finally, they declare explicitly that in this respect
they are followers of Descartes in his Discours de la me´thode. The example was
followed by Newton7, who starts the third Book of his Principia — not inci-
dentially named after another work by Descartes, the Principia Philosophiae8
— with a notorious set of (different!) “Regulae philosophandi”, rules to which
scientific practice should comply in order to lead to trustworthy new results.9
But Descartes had his immediate predecessors as well. Five years before the
publication of the Discours, a small group of scholars gathered to discuss the
then current ideas on “method”, and published the transactions of this private
academy under the title “De la me´thode”.10 Shortly before that, a notorious
critic and reformer of the scholastic curriculum at the universities of the time,
Peter Ramus, had used the term to refer to his new, “dialectical” system of
memory, designed to replace the older “rhetorical” one. Yates points out that
this in itself suggests that there might be a more intrinsic relation between “the
history of memory and the history of method”.11 In what follows we take this
suggestion seriously and show that this supposedly original theme reaches back
into the distant past and connects the birth of modern science in an unexpected
way to the older philosophical tradition. The connection runs through the notion
of inventio, the art of finding “new ideas”, new and truthful insights on any
6A. Arnauld et P. Nicole, o.c., p. 368.
7Newton had a copy of the latin translation of the Port Royal Logic in his personal library:
A. Arnauld & P. Nicole, Logica, sive Ars cogitandi: in quae praeter vulgares regulas plura
nova habentur ad rationem dirigendam utilia, E. Tertia apud Gallos ed. recognita & aucta in
Latinum versa, Londini, 1687. In the Harrison catalog of Newton’s library, this is item 79. I
have reasons to believe it has been given or pointed out to him by his friend Nicolas Fatio de
Duillier.
8A link evident to his contemporaries, as witnessed by Huygens in a letter to Leibniz dd.
May 1694, where he refers to the “raisonnement et experiences de Newton dans ses Principes
de Philosophie”, Oeuvres Comple`tes de Christian Huygens, X, n 2854, p. 614. On the rela-
tion between Newton and Descartes, see, e.g., A. Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2008.
9The genesis of Newton’s “rules” is problematic in itself and deserves far more attention
than it usually gets. A notable exception is I.B. Cohen, “Hypotheses in Newton’s Philosophy”,
Physis, VIII, 1966. An interesting study of scope and aim of Newton’s empiricism as voiced in
their final version is: A. Shapiro, “Newton’s Experimental Philosophy”, Early Modern Science
and Medicine, 9, 3, 2004.
10F.A. Yates, The Art of Memory, University of chicago Press, Chicago, 1966, p. 370, ft. 4.
11F.A. Yates, o.c., p. 369.
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subject of human interest to be presented before an audience or readership.12
Both the origins and repercussions of the different options regarding inventio
have much broader cultural and religious implications. We shall furthermore
see how, dually, different choices with respect to inventio appear to determine
the whole intellectual outlook of the individual committed to them. Matters
of ‘style’ can act as light-house fires on conceptual vessels searching for the
metaphysical home ports in which they were constructed, and by means of
which they ought to be construed: Les questions controverse´es de rhe´torique (...)
jouent donc un roˆle de´terminant dans lEurope catholique. Elles te´moingent de
pre´fe´rences qui vont quelquefois jusqu’a` des choix the´ologiques tranche´s.13 This
holds true not only for the catholic world, and remains so long after the advent of
Modernity, so that issues related to inventio provide us with a reliable compass
to follow the often hardly visible lines of fracture along which certain debates
concerning the foundations of mathematics have been taking place at the verge
of the twentieth century. We shall show how in origin rhetorical conceptions
feeding on metaphysical and even theological grounds continue to inform present
day mathematical thought, in particular in France, in a way that confirms the
findings of Graham and Kantor, but sheds a different light on them.
In order to set out the different positions in the debate, we focus on the
notion of the sublime, a concept central to early modern controversies on the
origin of rhetorical creativity. The sublime surpasses the rule-governed inventio,
as if it were a divine breath that infuses inspiration into the mind, causing a
furor or enthusiasm in the mind affected by it. According to Adrien Baillet, his
biographer, Descartes was well aware of the reality and force of this imaginative
enthusiasm:
[Descartes] ne croioit pas qu’on duˆt s’e´tonner si fort de voir que les
Poe`tes, meˆme ceux qui ne font que niaiser, fussent pleins de sen-
tences plus graves, plus sense´es, & mieux exprime´es que celles qui se
trouvent dans les e´crits des Philosophes. Il attribuait cette merveille
a` la divinite´ de l’Enthousiasme, & a` la force de l’imagination.14
This possibility of a direct contact between finite minds and the divine realm
was prone to be considered a blasphemy, and it crumbled under the rational-
ising weight of the Reformation, both protestant and catholic, that sought to
eradicate the last traces of “paganism” in all aspects of European cultural life:
De`s lors que l’enthousiasme, soumis a` la critique patiente et syste´-
matique de l’humanisme e´rudit, depuis Jules-Ce´sar Scaliger jusqu’a`
12The difference was vague well into the XVI-th century. During the Middle Ages, books
were considered as living beings to almost the same extend as the human beings who carried
them around physically or in their memory, “borne everywhere in the minds of their listeners”,
R. de Bury, Philobiblon, 4 (my italics). For more on this, see below.
13 M. Fumaroli, L’E´cole du silence, Le sentiment des images au XVIIe sie`cle, Flammarion,
Paris, 1998 [1994], p. 16.
14From Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes (1691), quoted in: M.H. Keefer, “the Dreamer’s Path:
Descartes and the Sixteenth Century”, Renaissance Quarterly, 49; 1996, p. 30.
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Me´ric Casaubon, n’apparait plus comme le principe se´minal de la
connaissance et de l’invention humaines, de`s lors que le principe de
raison s’impose a` sa place, ce sont des pans entiers de la culture
humaniste qui s’e´croulent, pour faire place a` un nouvel e´difice de
style moderne.15
Our intention is to show that this decline ultimately had consequences for for-
mal “arts” like mathematics as well. Acceptance or rejection of the sublime in
rhetoric is connected to the belief in an absolute or infinite realm to which a
great soul can connect, and has far-reaching theological consequences. It cuts
through the frontlines of the notorious “querelle des Anciens et Modernes”, and
bears upon precise conceptions of the relation between language, existence and
imagination. The sublime paves the way to the acceptance or rejection of the
notion of mathematical infinity. This intellectual connection is straightforward
and can be shown to shape. e.g., certain oppositions between Descartes and Pas-
cal, but it remains operative well into the twentieth century, where it explains
the different approaches developed to the actual infinite in the foundations of
mathematics by the French rational - heir to Descartes and Port Royal - school
(Poincare´, Lebesgue, Hadamard, Baire, Borel), and by the Moscow school of
mathematics (Egorov, Luzin, Florenskii, Suslin), feeded by a strand of orthodox
mysticism called the “Name-worshippers”, who shared a central tenet of the
defenders of the sublime, c.q., that , at least to a certain extend, ‘to name’ and
‘to exist’ coincide.16
The Rhetorical Structure of the World
We are so used to think by ourselves that we almost forget how rare and strange
this psychological feat actually is. Yet the ability to retract ‘within’ oneself is
a recent and culturally determined phaenomenon which was hardly available
throughout the major part of human history. Indeed, to think was to think
aloud. In our own Antiquity to think and to speak did largely coincide.17 If
we look at one of the traditional definitions of rhetoric as the ars bene dicendi
with this in mind, then the equally traditional viewpoint that moores rhetoric
so firmly to the correct ways to think, i.e. the ars inveniendi, the method for
discovery by which the mind “finds” new ideas, becomes something less of a sur-
prise. This “art of discovery” was itself linked to the ars memorativa, the use of
memory, that vast storehouse for both knowledge and imagination, the ground-
plan of which was organised by means of common places as well as particular
15M. Fumaroli, “Le cre´puscule de l’enthousiasme”, in: He´ros et Orateurs, Droz, Gene`ve,
1996, p. 376.
16Apart from the paper already cited, consult L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, “Name Wor-
shippers. Russian religious mystics and French rationalists: Mathematics 1900-1930”, Ameri-
can Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, vol. LVIII, nr 3, 2005. See also their recent book:
L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, Naming Infinity. A True Story of Religious Mysticism and
Mathematical Creativity, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009.
17R.B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1994 [1951], p. 13
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ones, and seemed to have the awesome capacity of bringing order and structure
into the world.18 Rhetoric implies much more than mere eloquence. This more-
over works in both ways: in the Mediaeval period, books were seen as extensions
of living memory, not the other way around: (...) books demanded to be alive, to
speak and converse, to be consumed and digested through the memories of living
people.19 Up to early modernity it was common to label Rhetorica treatises on
eloquence, but also those on matters spiritual or metaphysical. Now a crucial
rhetorical notion was that of method, the way to be followed by the mind in
order to discover new ideas, as well as the way to present them appropriately.
This was discussed in a work ascribed to the Hellenistic rhetor Hermogenes: On
the Method of Forcefulness.20 Thus when Descartes, that fierce opponent to the
rhetorical ways of thinking prevalent during his lifetime, nevertheless entitled
one of his most famous books Discours de la me´thode, he stayed faithful to a
vestige of that same tradition. Our present disdain for rhetoric is the excep-
tion, and one that becomes comprehensible only in the context of the history of
rhetoric itself. The strong interconnections between the religious and cultural
reformatory fervour that hit Renaissance Europe during the sixteenth century,
and the emergence of new conceptions on the functioning of the human mind,
have been brought to light in all their stunning complexity by F.A. Yates in
her remarkable studies on Renaissance memory. But memory was only one of
the five traditional canons of rhetorical art. This is why the Renaissance revo-
lution initiated by Petrus Ramus with respect to the use of memory articulates
with many other fundamental intellectual transitions during that period. Before
turning our attention to memory, we have to revise shortly the major steps in
the more general process.
During the Middle Ages, the rhetorical works by Cicero and Quintilian had
been accesible only incompletely, while the Greek sources, except Aristotle, had
been lost. Cicero’s De Inventione and the Ad Herrenium (erroneously attributed
him) were very influential treatises, in which the basic techniques for invention
and rhetorical exposition were given in a textbook style. In academical circles,
however, the Aristotelian tradition with respect to rhetorics as separated from
and inferior to dialectics reigned supreme: the focus was on truth as the most im-
portant means of persuasion. In this the scholastics were followers of Boethius,
according to whom dialectic comes down to logic: its aim is to ascertain the
truth of a statement by controversial argument, organised through the use of
common places (definitions, genera, species, qualities &.), which therefore be-
18The pioneering work studying these interplays during Renaissance is the already cited
book by F.A. Yates, The Art of Memory. More recent contributions to the field include
L. Bolzoni, La stanza della memoria, Einaudi, Turino 1995 (translated into English as The
Gallery of Memory in 2001, and M. Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, Cambridge University
press, Cambridge, 1998 (for the Middle Ages).
19M. Carruthers, “Mechanisms for the Transmission of Culture: The Role of “Place” in the
Arts of Memory”, in: Translation, or the Transmission of Culture in the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance, L. H. Hollengreen (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout, 2008.
20G.A. Kennedy (ed.), Invention and Method: Two Rhetorical Treatises from the Hermo-
genic Corpus, Brill, Leiden, 2005, p. 414.
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long to the realm of dialectics alone. This view starts to change when in 1415,
Poggio Bracciolini discovered in the monastery of St. Gall a complete copy of
Quintilian’s De Institutione oratoria.21 Its key notions, such as the core relation
between virtue and eloquence and the universal range of rhetoric, caused a
stirr throughout Renaissance Italy. The discovery of the complete Ciceronian De
Oratore by G. Landriani in Milan added to the commotion. Here we had a text
written in an extremely beautiful style, by means of dialogues, not by means of
dogmatic exposition, utterly different from the dry schemes of the School. This
forms the backdrop to a conflictual development that in fact had started already
with Petrarc, cut through the religious and cultural frontlines in Europe from tne
XVthe to the XVIIIth century and which became known, particularly in France,
as La Querelle des Ancies et Modernes. Evidently, the debate shifted in
shape, place and focus throughout that period: the scholastic “moderns” which
were the opponents to Erasmus differed in many respects from the Cartesian ra-
tionalists who were the ennemies of Montaigne, La Fontaine and Mme Dacier, or
the empirists who rejected Burke. Nevertheless, the line of fracture connecting
the parties at both sides of the breach remained the same: Les uns veulent ar-
rimer l’Europe Moderne au ge´nie antique. Les autres veulent s’en e´manciper.22
Understandebly enough, in the Italian city states of the XIV-XVth centuries,
the ideal of the orator-statesman had an evident appeal. Cicero thaught 1) that
the primary duty of man is action, and 2) that the vita activa does not distract
from one’s intellectual powers, but on the contrary stimulates them. Humanists
in, say, Florence were politically active men. Lorenzo Valla, former chancellor to
the Republic, was the author of two major works on rhetoric: Elegantiae linguae
latinae and Disputationes dialecticae. This stood in contrast to the thirteenth
century conception of Cicero’s flight from public life in order to devote himself
to speculation and philosophy. Now it was understood that, to Cicero, philos-
ophy implied the possesion of technical skills and an active stance in public
life: Hence, as Salutati observed in his De Nobilitate [ch. 23], the good is to
be more highly valued than the merely true, virtue preferred over knowlegde, the
will over the intellect, and thus rhetoric over philosophy and eloquence over wis-
dom.23 Quintilian’s book made it possible to clarify those relationships, because
he gave a comprehensive, coherent curriculum and subsumed all knowledge to
rhetoric, which embraces everything that concerns human life.
Only a few decades later, Manuzio’s legendary Aldine Press began to publish
the Greek rhetoricians: the 1508 edition of Rhetores graeci was soon followed
by Demosthenes, Hermogenes, and the other Attic rhetors. Another influential
source is the Byzantine scholar Trebizond (Trapezuntius, Crete ◦1395), whose
most important contribution to the history of rhetoric is his Rhetoricorum libri
quinque. Against Quintilian and Cicero, he holds that rhetoric should not neces-
sarily be practiced by a “good” man, it is a pragmatic political art indifferent to
morality. He based his book on Hermogenes’s On Ideas. But Trebizond’s system
21T.M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1990, p. 112 sq..
22M. Fumaroli, La Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, Gallimard, Paris, 2001, p. 8.
23T.M. Conley, o.c., p. 114
7
of mnemotechnic “common places” was so complicated, that he set the stage
for later reforms by Agricola and Ramus, whose wide-ranging reformation of
rhetorical arts started initially as an attempt to simplify the curriculum:
Agricola was (...) not just a reformer of the curriculum and a pre-
cursor of Ramus (...). He was at the center of a semantic revolu-
tion that reinaugurated the Classical view of invention as fundamen-
tally rhetorical, breaking with the Boethian tradition, which restricted
common places (as distinguished from particular ones) to dialectic,
and returning to the Ciceronian view that had established invention
and common places primarily in rhetoric and later extended them to
dialectic. Agricola’s critique of the tradition that separated rhetoric
and dialectic parallels that of Valla’s in the disputationes dialecti-
cae, but Agricola goes further by redefining “dialectic” not as an art
designed, as it was in the scholastic tradition, to secure the validity
of an argument, but rather as the art of inquiry itself — that is, a
dialectic which is at its core rhetorical.24
Rudolph Agricola thus remained within the controversialist tradition, but now
Ciceronian style — developing arguments in utramque partem —, and eman-
cipated from its Peripathetic metaphysical foundation and its dialectical pre-
tenses for “truth”. His use of non-figurative “common places” (genus, species,
quality...) as both a tool for analysis of an argument and an aid to memory
explains why he could assimilate rhetorics to dialectics, while claiming at the
same time that the aim of dialectics is persuasion by probable discourse, oratio.
His student Pierre de la Rame´e (Peter Ramus) radicalised these ideas in an al-
most opposite direction. For Ramus the aim of dialectic is again truth, ratio, but
now in a Platonising context of access to truth not through controversies but
through the correct, hierarchical application of the common places in the chain
of an argument: Indeed, properly conducted, dialectical inquiry (....) puts us in
contact with “all the multitude of things as they are in Gods own mind” (dial.
Inst., 38f).25 These divisional schemes largely coincide with the mnemotechnical
Ramist epitome, wherein every subject was “arranged” going from the general to
the special through conceptual dichotomy.26 This goes back directly on Plato’s
conception of genuine dialectics as dichotomous division of concepts, exposed in
the dialogues Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus.27 Evidently, for Ramus rhetoric
is inferior to dialectic, since it only deals with style and delivery of unscientific
(not truth-related) discourse. Invention, disposition (the proper arrangment of
arguments) and memory are the privilige of the inhabitants of the province of
dialectics alone. Now all these seemingly very technical discussions had strong
24T.M. Conley, o.c., p. 125.
25T.M. Conley, o.c., p. 130.
26F.A. Yates, o.c., p. 232.
27I explained how and why Plato develops this method in a paper discussing the relation be-
tween Plato’s logic and his ontology: K. Verelst, On what Ontology Is and not-Is, Foundations
of Science, 13, 3, 2008.
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reverberations in the ongoing religious debates between moderate catholic in-
tellectuals and the proponents of protestant Reformation, more specificially the
debate between Erasmus and Luther. As a young student, Erasmus had been
acquainted with Agricola, who inculcated him with an erudite sense for good
style and an understanding of the ultimately undecidable nature of rational
argumentation.28 Ramus exerted on the other hand considerable influence on
Luther with his assertive dialectics of certainty and his disdain for rhetorical
controversy, mainly through the protestant theologist Melanchton.
As if things were not yet complicated enough, in 1555 a bombshell was
dropped in the middle of the debate by the publication in Italy of a by then
virtually unknown Greek manuscript with a sensational content, the peri hyp-
sous or De sublimitate.29 In it, its author, known as pseudo-Longinus, discusses
the ultimate source on which all invention needs to feed in order to get access
to truly new, original ideas, the sublime (to hypsos). One can practice to gain
access to this source, in spite of its divine nature, by developing the capacity
to master the most vehement emotions and express them in an appropriately
grand style. It is as if the orator develops a kind of potential participation in
the divine breath into an actual capacity. pseudo-Longinus calls this exercise
explicitly a method [De Subl., II.3(3-4)]30, and he who masters this art has a
literally unlimited source of inspiration at his disposal. He will be able to ex-
press everything in the appriopriate way immediately, like a prophet or a seer.
ps.-Longinus compares its effect with that of a bold of lightning [I.4(9-10)].
One of the main instruments to achieve this goal is by the intensive training of
rhetorical memory.
So, during Renaissance, these ancient memory techniques made a forceful re-
appearance on the public scene, but now in the potentially explosive mixture of
neo-Platonic natural magic, Hermetism, and their concomittant urge to expand
the powers of the mind. Interest in these mental powers had been resurrected
already before, by the translation and publication by Marsilio Ficino of a Greek
manuscript containing the main part of the Corpus Hermeticum, ordered by
Cosimo de Medici and published in 1464. Thus the essential trait of Renaissance
mnemotechnical art was that it became an undisentangible alloy with religious
enthousiasm, which caused a huge and increasingly hostile respons.
Cette “conque`te mystique”, qui avait eu plus toˆt son pendant en
Italie et en Espagne, fut contemporaine, dans toute l’Europe, d’une
28The extend to which authors like Erasmus, Montaigne... can be taken to be sceptical
thinkers, and their relation to a strand of Renaisance philosophy called Pyrrhonism, has been
studied in great detail by R.H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza,
University of California Press, Berkeley &., 1979.
29Originally ascribed — erroneously — to the Hellenist writer Longinus. Its authorship
remains unknown, but it became custom to refer to him is as “pseudo-Longinus”. The history
of its rediscovery is exposed in detail in M. Fumaroli, “Rhe´torique d’e´cole et rhe´torique adulte:
la re´ception europe´enne du Traite´ du sublime au XVIe et au XVIIe sie`cle”, He´ros, pp. 388-393.
30Right from the start of his treatise, ps.-Longinus stresses the importance of the acquisition
of the correct techniques to handle the sublime. He calls those who venture unprepared into
this realm “a-methodon”, unqualified. I used the Bude´ critical edition: H. Lebe`gue (ed.), Du
sublime, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1952.
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ve´ritable obsession de de´monologie et de sorcellerie, et dans les pays
protestants, d’une prolife´ration des sectes d’enthousiastes.31
A curious and interesting example of this alloy of mystical inspiration and
rhetorical mnemotechnical method is Ioannis Mauburnus’s (Jan Mombaer) Rose-
tum. Excercitiorum Spiritualium et Sacrarum.32 Mombaer, born in Brussels,
was a friend of Thomas a Kempis. He belonged to a reputed Mediaeval school
of Rhineland-Flemish mysticism (Ruusbroec, Eckhardt), which was the source
of inspiration for the Dutch theologist Geert Groote when developing his devo-
tio moderna.33 This seems innocent enough. But Agricola as a young boy was
educated by the Brethren of the Common Life, a religious order that belonged
to this influential strand of mystical Christianity. He moreover studied in the
Augustinian monastery at Erfurt, where also Luther had learned to meditate by
using the Rosetum. Indeed, even Luther has known the book, for he refers to it
in his 1513 Psalmenvorlesungen.34 Finally, Erasmus was personally acquainted
with Mauburnus, witness the correspondence between the two.35 Mombaer gives
an overview of the Christian mystical tradition from Antiquity up to Pico de la
Mirandola, and describes a technique which uses the human hand as the “place”
to organise memory as an aid to spiritual meditation (but behold the columns
which line up the drawing at the sides of the page).36 Mombaer’s book was one of
the first ever to be printed in Europe and it had an enormous succes. Ironically
enough, the theological reaction championed by precisely Augustinian catholi-
cism (like Jansenism) and protestantism against this kind of spiritual commu-
nion with the Deity would become more and more outspoken in the course of
the XVI-th century. We shall come back to this below.
31M. Fumaroli, “Le cre´puscule de l’enthousiasme”, in: He´ros et Orateurs, Droz, Gene`ve,
1996, p. 349.
32The first edition appeared in 1491, in Basle. The work is discussed in E. Benz, Meditation,
Musik und Tanz. U¨ber de “Handpsalter”, eine spa¨tmittelalterliche Meditationsform uas dem
Rosetum des Mauburnus, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz, Steiner
Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1976. He also gives the drawing reproduced below. A detailed analysis
of its content in K. Pantsers, De kardinale deugden in de Lage Landen, Uitgeverij Verloren,
2007, pp. 187-197.
33B. Todoroff, Laat heb ik je liefgehad. Christelijke mystiek van Jezus tot nu, Davidsfonds,
Leuven, 2002, p. 227 sq.
34M. Nicol, Meditation bei Luther, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Go¨ttingen, 1990, p. 40 sq.
35E.F. Rice, “Erasmus and the Religious Tradition 1495-1499”, Journal of the History of
Ideas, 1, 4, 1950.
36Evidently I didn’t know Carruthers’s 2008 article when I presented the first draft of this
paper at the 2006 Cambridge conference, but I’m happy to note that my hesitating attempts
at establishing this connection are confirmed by the work of such a distinguished specialist in
the field. Cfr. the examples she discusses on pp. 12-13 of her Mechanisms-paper.
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 Mombaer’s Handpsalter, from his Rosetum, Basle, 1491.
But these softly Platonizing tendencies stayed carefully within the boundaries of
Christianity. There were those who called for a much more radical philosophical
reform. The work exemplary for this radical “Hermetic” Renaissance philoso-
phy is that of Giordano Bruno, who presents us with the baffling mixture of a
superbly mathematically skilled magus who holds very modern conceptions on
infinity, while practicing at the same time the most impenetrable astrological
arts, and devoting himself to practising the intensification of imagination by the
use of rhetoric memory as a magical tool.37
One of Bruno’s aims was to ‘formalise’ the art of memory by using Ramon
Lull’s “combinatorial wheels” with the traditional technique of enhanced inner
representation.38 Lull, a contemporary to Thomas Aquinas, developed an as-
tonishing “Art”, the aim of which was to organise all knowledge on the basis of
a meditation on the names of God (the Dignitates Dei). There are nine fun-
37See the brilliant study by F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991 [1964]. For a point of view critical to
her approach, H. Gatti, Giordano Bruno and Renaissance Science, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca and London, 1999. The Lullian wheel reprinted here is discussed on p. 182 of Yates’s
Memory-book.
38For a detailed study of the first stage of Bruno’s Lullism, see M. Mertens, “A Perspec-
tive on Bruno’s De Compendiosa Architectura et Complemento Artis Lulli”, Bruniana &
Campanalliana, iv, 2, 2009.
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damental names of God organised in triads (goodness, greatness, eternity,...),
which form a kind of ladder of being along which the ‘artista’ ascends and de-
scends. At the same time they ground a memory system organised by means of
combinatory wheels — labeled from B to K — laying out the interconnections
that everything in creation entertains with the attributes of the Creator:
A Lullian wheel, from his Ars brevis, in: Opera, Strasburg, 1617.
Yates gives the following explanation: The geometry of the elemental structure
of the world of nature combines with the divine structure of its issue out of the
Divine names to form the Universal Art which can be used on all subjects because
the mind works through it with a logic which is patterned on the universe.39 It is
a system which is universally valid and that allows the initiated to ‘see’ at once
the multiple realisations of that universal truth: He claimed that a universally
valid method for attaining knowledge on the whole of the ‘cosmic building’ was
within his reach. All this philosophical brilliance aimed at restoring the direct
connection between man and his Creator, and was really part of a pan-European
neo-Platonic movement which had an enormous influence and which lies at the
heart of the — literal — sublimity of the cultural heritage of European High
Renaissance.40
39F.A. Yates, o.c., p. 181.
40 I.P. Couliano, Eros et Magie a` la Renaissance, Flammarion, Paris, 1984.
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The Reformation of Memory
A critical response — as well as a growing number of accusations of heresy
— was making its way. A first line of attack was opened already before the
publication of On the Sublime, by an influential Aristotelian at Leyde, J.-C.
Scaliger, who wanted to counter Cardanus’s De Subtilitate, in which the exis-
tence of splendor a kind of direct mystical knowledge was defended. Scaliger
claims that the relation between objects and our knowledge of them is the same
as that between knowledge and its expression by rational means, and that this
is all there is to it. A second, more devastating line of attack was launched
by Isaac Casaubon, who destroyed the historical basis of Ficino’s neo-Platonic
natural philosophy, by demonstrating in 1614 on philological grounds that the
Corpus Hermeticum dated from the Hellenistic period, and not, as Ficino be-
lieved, from times immemorial. The in many respect decisive move was made
by his son Meric Casaubon, a professor at Oxford, in 1655, when he published
his Treatise concerning Enthousiasm. He dealt a final blow to the credibility of
whatever kind of furor by relocating it into the realm of the pathological.41 This
line of thought was taken up again by his Cambridge colleague Henry More, a
Platonist of the rationalist kind, in his book A brief discourse of the nature,
causes, kinds and cure of Enthusiasm.42
In about the same period, another line of attack was opened by Galilei, who
ridiculed the scholars that used the works of Aristotle as a kind of store-house
from which they could extract pieces of textual evidence and combine them is a
way as to provide an answer to whatever problem one put on the table. Thus,
F. Hallyn remarks, the texts of Aristotle constitute in themselves a topical
memory system: une veritable topique (...) qui contient en soi tous les lieux de
l’invention scientifique.43 Scientists following this ‘method’ to arrive at new ideas
are, according to Galilei in a for more than one reason remarkable comparison,
like those painters who put very strict but completely arbitrary constraints on
themselves while composing a portrait of a person by means of vegetables only.
The crucial step in Galilei’s (evidently itself rhetorical) argument occurs where
he says that it is as if the “book of the world” was written only for Aristotle to
be seen with his own eyes, and for us to rely on him for all posterity.44 Galilei
proposes to replace Aristotle by the Book of Nature as the Topica for true
invention about the world, lying open for eveyone to see and willing to study
41He plays therefore a key roˆle in the shift from bodily to mental normality, as it has been
described by Foucault in his l’Histoire de la folie a` l’aˆge classique.
42It is well known that Newton as a young student was an avid reader of his work. J. Henry,
“Henry More and Newton’s Gravity, History of Science, 31, 1993. It is relevant to our concerns
to point out that More discusses how God’s tituli precisely serve as an indication of the abyssal
gap between Him and his creation. This discussion clearly influenced Newton when writing
his General scholium to the Principia. For an analysis of the textual relationshiop, see: R.
De Smet and K. Verelst, ”Newtons Scholium Generale. The Platonic and Stoic legacy: Philo,
Justus Lipsius and the Cambridge Platonists”, History of Science, xxxix, 2001, pp. 10-11.
43F. Hallyn, Dialectique et rhe´torique devant la “nouvelle science” du VXIIe scie`cle”, in:
M. Fumaroli, Histoire de la rhe´torique dans l’Europe moderne, PUF, Paris, 1999, p. 606.
44In his third letter on sun spots, see “Istoria e demonstrazioni itorno alla macchie solari,
terza littera” (1613), in: Opere de Galileo Galilei, v, p. 190.
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it.45 This appropriation of the metaphor of the “Book of Nature” — which
returns in the dialogue on the Two World Systems — is al the more remarkable,
because it had been used in the past over and over again to make the opposite
point, namely, that scripture and nature refer to the same thing, because they
stand in an allegorical relation that ultimately points back to the origin of
everything, God. Augustine had started this tradition [Confessions, XIII.xv],
followed by Hugh of St. Victor [De tribus diebus 4]: For the whole sensible world
is like a kind of book written by the finger of God (...) each particular creature
is somewhat like a figure, not invented by human decision, but instituted by the
divine will to manifest the invisible things of Gods wisdom.46 This approach
climaxed in the work of the Catalan theologist Raymond Sebond, who wrote
around 1435 a Natural Theology or Book of Creatures. It was translated and
commented upon by Michel de Montaigne in an Apology for Raymond Sebond,
and published as chapter 12 in the second part of his Essays as late as 1580! So,
exactly as is the case with Descartes’s occupation of the territory of ‘method’
for the “new science”, Galilei’s conquest of the ‘Book of Nature’ reveals as much
as destroys the tradition on the borderline of which they stand, and which will
be crossed irreversably only by their successors.
But before we can make truly sense of these critcisms, we need to bet-
ter understand how the traditional rhetorical memory works. And in order to
understand rhetorical memory, we need to take a closer look at ancient psychol-
ogy, which diverges in important aspects from the modern understanding of the
functioning of the human mind. The ancients hold that thoughts are made of
images, and these images constitute themselves the basic material for cogita-
tio, active thinking. But these images are by no means direct representations
of bodily sense impressions; they are not mere mental copies of the things per-
ceived. Sense impressions are collected in the sensus communis or phantasia;
afterwards they are processed by the “image-forming ability, imaginatio or vis
formalis”.47 So an experience becomes an image through an active power (vis)
of the mind. The result of the combined activity of both organs (located in the
brain) are mental “images having formal properties that are perceptible and
useful to human thought”, i.e., they are accessible to development in argumen-
tation. Moreover, impressions are always subject to an act of estimation, a kind
of instinctive judgment through yet another mental power, the vis aestimativa:
Conceptions (imagines) are thus constructed by the mind from all the
materials of sensation, and they have two characteristics; likeness or
similitudo, and also a “feeling” that marks them emotionally. Thus,
in this psychology there is no such thing as a completely neutral or
“objective” experience, since all the images or phantasiai in which
we comprehend our experience are already colored with some feeling
before we can “know” them.48
45F. Hallyn, o.c., p. 607.
46The quote is in P. Harrison’s public lecture, delivered at Cambridge, May 24th, 2005. The
text can be downloaded at http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/CIS/Harrison/.
47M. Carruthers, Mechanisms, p. 4.
48M. Carruthers, Mechanisms, p. 5.
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Thus, the acquisition of the building blocks for the production of ideas in the
mind is far from a passive process! Mental images can be stored in and retrieved
again from memoria by cogitatio; the active process of recollection taking place
through a valve in the brain which connects the two functional realms: the
vermis. Storage should be such that images can be retraced without too much
difficulty; they have to be marked and arranged in the mental places (topica
or loci) that make up our memory. Ancient memory is spatial, not logical by
nature. Now, how does this rhetorical memory work? Here, again, the ancient
sources at our disposal are Aristotle’s Rhetorica; Cicero’s De Inventione and
De Oratore; the anonymous tract Ad Herennium, and pseudo-Longinus’s De
Sublimitate. These sources are mainly Roman or Hellenistic, but testimonia
going back to the pre-Socratic period exist.49 The baseline is that, in order to
remember things afterwards (according to Aristtole: memory is a thing of the
past), one has to arrange visually strong mental representations in a internalised
spatial set-up. The traditional way was to internalise the complete structure of
architectural artefacts like houses, palaces, squares etc., and to fill these places
(loci) according to the logic of their groundplan with vivid images (imagines
agentes) that represent the things to be remembered. As we have seen, such
images are both rationally and emotionally structured; the capacity to be an
agent (to ‘touch’ the soul) is linked to their emotional content, not just to the
idea of bodily movement. The author of Ad Herennium stresses the fact that
places should be bright, not shadowy, and not be taken from crowed areas, for
passing-by people might confuse the searching mind! [III, xiv, 31]! Images should
not be vague or banal, but exceptional in their beauty or singular in their uglines,
wearing crowns or purple cloaks, or being disfigured or moving [III. xxii, 37].50
Since a classical building always follows fixed architectural laws, this method
is truly a method: the logic of the building determines the logic of recollection.
Beware, however, that it is not the groundplan but the building itself that should
be erected in the mind: its vivid quality is an essential ingredient to the succesful
application of the method:
He (Simonides) inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty
(of memory) must select places and form mental images of the things
they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that
the order of the places will preserve the order of the things, and the
images of the things will denote the things themselves, and we shall
employ the places and images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and
the letters written on it.51
Penetrating internal visions make words and ideas come back “automatically”
when one re-enters the memory-storehouse. After using them, one could empty
the places of the inner architecture and re-use them afterwards. Or one could
49Pliny the Elder tells us that Metrodous of Scepsis perfected the memory that was invented
by Simonides of Ceos [Natural History, 7.24]. This Simonides was a fifth century lyric poet.
50I used the edition in the Loeb Classical Library: E.H. Warmington (ed.), Cicero. Ad C.
Herennium Libri IV, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968 [1954].
51F.A. Yates, o.c., p. 2 (the quote stems from Cicero’s De oratore).
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keep them and build another mental palace on top of it. Astonishing testimonies
of the mental capacities thus developed abound. Augustine speaks literally about
“infinite memory”. This explains why inventio was also largely dependent on
the capacity to collect and arrange common or particular places in the inner
architecture of one’s mind. This use of memory extends throughout the Middle
Ages and well into early Modernity: One should think of a properly inventoried
medieval scholar’s memory store as distributed across and linked throughout an
organized network, a network that can be entered at any of an infinite number
of places by means of a mark (nota) that is also a key (clavis), providing access
from any point to the rich treasury of memory.52
 
The monastery of St. Gall memory palace
In the Mediaeval period it becomes customary to use plans instead of the build-
ings themselves as recollection and meditation devices. The maps may well be
completely imaginary, idealised arrangements of some utopian arcchitecture like
the example reprinted above.53 This idealistic feature brings out the method-
ological backbone of the practice, for it stresses the idea of a preferred itinerary
to be followed,— the moral path through monastic life mirrored in the quiet
journey through the monastery’s houses and gardens.54
52M. Carruthers, o.c., p. 7 (my bold).
53Carruthers, Mechanisms, p. 15.
54The pathway-aspect of the “meta hodos” has been discussed by Derrida with respect to
Descartes’s Discours... See M.H. Keefer, o.c., pp. 30-36.
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This more ‘abstract’ use of the place-memory maybe foreshadows to some
extent the later Ramist reformation. Ramus himself, however, was inspired by
Quintilian, who had criticised the Greek defenders of rhetorical memory. Quin-
tilian proposed a “dialectical method” to organise memory instead, based on
“dividing and composing” (Inst. Orat., XI, ii, 36). As already pointed out, these
divisional schemes largely coincide with the mnemotechnical Ramist epitome,
wherein every subject was “arranged” going from the general to the special
through conceptual dichotomy.55 In fact, with Ramus, logic and memory coin-
cide, but it is with an abstract, imageless memory that calls upon the use of
intellectual powers only, not on those of imagination: The ‘natural’ stimulus for
memory is now not the emotionally exciting memory image; it is the abstract
order of dialectical analysis, which is yet, for Ramus, natural, since dialecti-
cal order is natural to the mind.56 This ideal of simplicity and naturalness, as
supposed to the sophistication of the artificiality of traditional memory, is a
common theme underscoring the different reformatory parties, both protestant
and catholic.
The Renaissance up to the end of the sixteenth century is charac-
terised by an emerging conflict between the humanism of Ciceronian
controversia and the newer expressions of a platonizing tendency to
restore dialectic as the fundamental intellectual discipline. This con-
flict comes out clearly in the debates between Erasmus and Luther,
which pit a view of rhetoric that is basically bilateral and symmetri-
cal and that aims at the satis probabile, against a view like Plato’s,
where the Truth is to be communicated effectively in a unilateral, as-
symetrical setting. (...) Eventually, the humanistic controversialist
rhetoric gave way, first, to the platonizing Ramists and, afterward
(...) to the empiricists and Cartesians (...). 57
Especially access through memory to the (Lullian) dignitates Dei or names or
properties of God under the form of symbolic images, created a forceful reaction
from calvinist and puritan sides. They called upon Ramus’s imageless dialecti-
cal theory of memory as an alternative for the mnemotecnical “idolatry”. The
puritan theologian W. Perkins even called for an absolute prohibition of the use
of images as an aid to the mind! But also catholics who stood under the influ-
ence of Augustinianism, like the Jansenists, were very critical. Their common
concern is the desire to purify Christianity from all remnants of paganism: C’est
sous l’influence d’un augustinisme plus soucieux de trancher entre paganisme et
christianisme, entre nature et graˆce, que (...) la notion d’inspiration enthousi-
aste (...) se verra menace´e me`me dans le domaine rhe´torique et poe´tique.58
In the introduction to this paper I mentioned Arnauld and Nicole, au-
thors of the Port Royal Logic. The orginal title of the book is: La Logique,
55F.A. Yates, o.c., p. 232.
56F.A. Yates, o.c., p. 234.
57T.M. Conley, o.c., pp. 143-144.
58M. Fumaroli, “Cre´puscule”, in He´ros, p. 351.
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ou l’art de penser. It evidently fits in the reform-movement we outlined be-
fore, together with other attempts to revolutionise the “art of thought”, like
Johannes Claubergs Logica Vetus et Nova (1654), which might have been one
of its sources of inspiration.59 Arnauld & Nicole’s principal innovation is the
distinction between a thing and its representation, like a word and the thought
that it expresses: (...) les mots sont des sons distinctes & articule´s, dont les
hommes ont fait des signes pour marquer ce qui se passe dans leur esprit [II.1].60
This seemingly innocent statement marks the fundamental breach with the
past: even though disposition, style, and delivery are method-governed disci-
plines, the characteristic proper to inspired discourse is that the word and the
thing it represents disappears: Le sublime (...) abolit la be´ance entre pre´sence
at repre´sentation.61As Foucault points out appropriately62, this separation of
words and things marks out the transition from the XVI-th to the XVII-th
century, and will be part and parcel of any modern liguistic theory: Ainsi le
signe enferme deux ide´es: l’une de la chose qui repre´sente; l’autre de la chose
repre´sente´e [I.4].63 But Arnauld and Nicole operate their distinction in a much
larger sense, so as to separe cause and effect in natural phaenomena, or even
in theology, like the symptomes of an illness, ot the stigmata of the suffering
Christ [I.4]. A judgment concerning something is then a proposition consisting
of this subject and a praedicate. Starting from this analysis, they defend a new
method for invention based on logic to deduce new ideas. The conception of
logic they defend is anti-Aristotelian in the sense that it is based on mathemat-
ical deductions as opposed to syllogistic ones. They evidently have geometry
in mind, which remains after all, as far as proofs are concerned, “an exercise
in logic, classically”.64 Why then geometry, instead of pure logic? Because of a
problem that had been pointed out, among others, already by Descartes, and
which has been summed up nicely by J. Henry: The trouble with ’reason’, as
was clear from the fact that both Calvinists and Papists could claim it for their
side, was that it could be made to subserve virtually any cause.65 Geometry, by
virtue of the fact that it has a proper content related to facts of nature, seemed
to be a more reliable guided to certainty than the subtleties of controversial dis-
putation. Arnauld and Nicole then, predictably, proceed in Part III to a critical
discussion of the “lieux”, the traditional loci or common places that were in use
to structure rhetorical memory. The remarkable thing, however, is the explicit
influence exerted by Arnauld’s religious affiliations. Already the first page of
59See the introduction to J. Clauberg, Logique Ancienne et Nouvelle, J. Lagre´e and G.
Coqui (eds.), Vrin, Paris, 2007.
60Logique, p. 143.
61M. Fumaroli, “Re´ception”, in: He´ros, p. 383.
62M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses. Une archologie des sciences humaines, Gallimard,
Paris, 1966, ch. II.
63Logique, p. 80.
64D. Finkelstein, “Matter, Space and Logic”, in: The Logico-algebraic Approach to Quan-
tum Mechanics II. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Boston
colloquium for the philosophy of science V, C.A. Hooker (ed.), 1966, pp. 199-215.
65J. Henry,“The Scientific Revolution in England”, in: The Scientific Revolution in National
Context, R. Porter and M. Teich (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 193.
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the first chapter of the Logique contains a reference to St. Augustine. And he
was a theologist adhering to the “movement of Port Royal”, a catholic heresy
also known under the name Jansenism, for its founder, Cornelius Jansen, the-
ologist at Louvain and bishop of Ypres, who published (posthumously) a book
on Augustine in 1640. From this book five heretical theses were extracted, and
condamnation followed in 1643.66 Jansenist theology is Augustinian by inspi-
ration and marked out by strong resemblances to several tendencies in radical
protestant Enlightment, i.e., Calvinist, puritan, millenarian and prophetic. It
included positions on the role of God’s grace, not ot be derserved by everybody
but only for a group of ‘elected’, with the ensuing obligation to moral purity, and
the remarkable but related thesis that Jesus the Saviour was not born to save
everybody; strong tenets on praedestination; a belief in the prophetic renewal
of the Church, etc. The French philosopher Pascal belonged to their followers as
well. It was vehemently anti-papal, and for quite a while on its way to constitute
the intellectual backbone of an “E´glise gallicaine”, a strand of French catholi-
cism much more independent from ecclesiastical authority than the traditional
“Roman” one. They were condemned several times after 1643, and by different
popes (Alexander VII, Bull Ad sacram (1656); Clemens XI, Bull Unigenitus Dei
Filius (1711).67 The Jansenists called for a rationalisation and purification of
both language and of the ars inveniendi, not in the sense of Ramus, but in
the sense of Descartes. Arnauld and Nicole are also the authors of a Grammaire
ge´ne´rale et raisonne´e contenant les fondemens de l’art de parler, explique´s d’une
manie`re claire et naturelle68, which essentially claims that the basic structures of
language are simple, innate and universal.69 The separation of mentalisties can
be gauged from the fact that C. Favre de Vaugelas, co-founder of the Acade´mie
and one of the main editors of its Dictionnaire, published only fifteen years
before a book Remarques sur la langue franaise, utiles ceux qui veulent bien
parler et bien e´crire, of which the central tenet was that the best way to master
the French language was to copy the ways of speech — “le bon usage” — of the
members of the royal court.
For Meric Casaubon, the poetically transgressing “inspired” mind is nothing
more than a pahtological mind, vulnerable to the ruses of paganism. True judg-
ment requires nothing but “bare speech” to expose “the true nature of things”.
Words are nothing but representations, the mental face of sensible things. Thus
a conceptual line links the in origin Aristotelian conception of words as symbola
rerum defended by both Scaliger and Casaubon, directly to Locke’s Essay on Hu-
man Understanding (1690). Indeed, nobody will be surprised to find that it con-
66J.P. Chantin, le janse´nisme, Paris, Cerf, 2000.
67L. Cognet, Le Janse´nisme, PUF, Paris, 1995 [1961], p. 72; p. 85 sq.
68A. Arnauld et C. Lancelot, Grammaire ge´ne´rale et raisonne´e, E´ditions Allia, Paris, 1997
[1660].
69The work inspired Noam Chomsky in the development of his “generative grammar”, which
he himself qualifies as a part of a wider approach to language, “Cartesian linguistics”. see N.
Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics. A Chapter in the history of Rationalistic Thought, New York
and London, 1966.
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tains a critique of enthousiasm which insists on the lack of proof for the pretenses
to certain knowledge that any utterance grounded in it could claim. On the other
hand, Henry More succesfully ridiculises the melancholic temperaments unable
to discriminate between a bodily affliction and the workings of God’s grace.70
While the English Aristotelians and later empirists thus succeeded in effectively
abolishing any credible remnants of the “inspired” forms of knowledge to the
extend that all activity involving possible errants into l’irrationnel, l’inspiration,
la dicte´e “de´monique” — even philosophy —- became suspect, the alliance be-
tween “simplicite´” and “le sublime” was to shape what Rene´ Bray was to call
“la doctrine classique”, that gracious philosophical “art de converser” in urban
life in France’s XVII-XVIII-th centuries. Even the detractors of rhetorics had
to put their cause eloquently! During that period, the debate on the nature of
the sublime will resurface, but now within the safe confines of the domain of the
arts, in the modern sense of that word. The notorious Querelle des Anciens et
Modernes, initiated by Montaigne, was to oppose the great French dramatists
Racine and Corneille, the writers Perrault and Balzac.71 But even Boileau, au-
thor of a De l’art poe´tique, and the first translator of the De Sublimitate into
French, had to surrender at least partially to Scaliger’s criticisms.72 This evacu-
ation of philosophy into the realm of literature went at the cost of its immediate
connection to and relevance for reality, whether mundane or sublime: imagina-
tion became a sphere of life disconnected from “science” as it was practiced in
laboratories or at the theorist’s writing desk.
Car les contraintes psychologiques et meˆme physiques qu’exerca la
reforme de l’E´glise - du coˆte´ protestant comme du coˆte´ catholique -
ne furent que de peu infe´rieures a` celles exerce´es par la Re´volution
francaise a` son apoge´e ou - mutatis mutandis - par la re´volution
sovie´tique. (...) A un moment donne´, la censure avait transforme´ la
personnalite´: les gens avaient perdu l’habitude d’utiliser activement
leur imagination et de penser par “qualite´s”, car cela n’e´tait plus per-
mis. La perte de la faculte´ d’imagination active entraˆına force´ment
avec elle l’observation rigoureuse du monde mate´riel et celle-ci se
traduisit par une attitude de respect pour toute donne´e quantitative
et de soupc¸on envers toute assertion d’ordre “qualitatif”.73
When the gates of the soul finally closed on the sublime as a road to ultimate
reality, the way was free for a strictly rational account of the functioning of the
human mind in its relation to the world. Both the empirists and the Cartesio-
Leibnizian rationalists are holding the same line with respect to this, be it armed
with very different argumentive weaponry. Style becomes a facet of the first per-
son in the small sense, — the birth of the subject, so to speak, and the birth
of the idea that debates are a matter of mere “personal opinion”. The question
70M. Fumaroli, “Cre´puscule”, in He´ros, pp; 372-372.
71M. Fumaroli, Querelle, pp. 7-10.
72M. Fumaroli, “Cre´puscule”, in He´ros, p. 360.
73I.P. Couliano, Eros et Magie a` la Renaissance, Flammarion, Paris, 1984, p. 240.
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of knowledge belongs from now on to an entirely different realm. The empirists
evacuate the question of the sources of knowledge to the outside world, and re-
duce it to the relation between that world and the sensual impressions we receive
from it. This approach will be epitomised in the Regulae Philosophandi by which
the mature Newton starts Book III of the Principia. The clearest example of the
nature of the periods’ concern with method, however, is Leibniz, who explicitly
links the trustworthliness of his caracteristica universalis to the exhaustive suc-
cess of his ars inveniendi. And all are deeply indepted to Descartes’s ideas. We
by now have reached the point were the story of Graham and Kantor begins.
When Existence is in a Name
During the spring of 1913, the Russian navy attacked the monasteries on the
peninsula of Athos in order to destroy a Christian-orthodox heresy that had
been condemned shortly before by the synod of St. Petersburg. More than 1000
monks were arrested and imprisoned. What was the nature of this heresy, and
why did it call for such a violent reaction? Its roots go back to a problem that
had haunted theology since centuries: the question whether God can be known,
and if not, how He can be worshipped.74 In the Western or Latin church, answers
to this question had been provided along two different lines: that God is to a
certain extend rationally knowable through His creation, but at the same time,
as far as His mysterious nature is concerned, He remains out of reach for mortal
minds, and one can trust only on faith, as revealed in Scripture and transmitted
by the Church. The consequences of this ambivalence had stirred Christianity
in its foundations already in the thirteenth century, for it developed into the
theory of double truth75, which held that if reason proved something to be true,
while its contrary was a matter of faith, then both acquired validity. The follow-
ers of this school of thought were mainly Aristotelian masters at the Facutly of
Arts at University the University of Paris. They are called “Latin Averroists”,
after the notorious Arab philosopher and commentator of Aristotle, Averroes
(Ibn Rushd), and condemned in 1277 by bishop Etienne Tempier. In reaction
to the radical Aristotelians, Thomas Aquinas developed his magistral Summa
Theologica, in which the syntesis between Aristotelianism and Catholic dogma
was coined that would govern Latin orthodoxy for centuries to come. But a
too sharp division between reason and faith was ad odds with the neo-Platonic
currents feeding Christianity since late Antiquity, and on whose fertile soil mys-
tical tendencies using music, poetry and meditation techniques, had flourished
throughout the Middle Ages. The Mediaeval church had been rather lenient to-
ward them, even though they were often teetering on heresy because of the theo-
logically unacceptable idea that the exalted soul could somehow unify itself with
the deity. One can clearly see the resonances with the theological and philosoph-
74This is in fact a variation on Meno’s knowledge paradox, presented by Plato in the dialogue
bearing the same name: how can one learn what one does not know, given the fact that one
does not know one does not know it?
75E. Gilson, “La doctrine de la double ve´rite´,” in: E´tudes de philosophie me´die´vale, Univer-
site´ de Strasbourg, 1921.
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ical disputes on inspiration and invention we discussed above. The connection
becomes explicit in the work of some of the main characters in the dramatic se-
quence of events: from Lull’s “crusade” against Averroism via Ramus’s defence
of the Paris masters, we enter the Reformation period during which the chasm
between revealed and discovered truth will deepen to the extend that it will
eventually lead to Galilei’s 1633 condemnation.76 Nevertheless, at both sides of
the gap there was agreement on the need to reject and even persecute religious
“enthousiasts” of all stripes, but especially the rapidly spreading millenarian
Protestant sects like the “French Prophets”. They believed they could commu-
nicate with the deity directly through possessions, including visions, prophecy,
and trances, induced by dancing and music. They belonged to a bigger group of
radical Protestants, the Camisards, who had been violently oppressed since the
revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). In 1706 a group of refugees lead by
Elie Marion arrived in London, where they met again with oppressive authori-
ties. Notwithstanding that oppression, they continued to exert lasting influence
through their writings. Marion had written a treatise on prophecy, Les Aver-
tissements prophe´tiques77, which laid the basis for the later Shaker movement.78
But in Britain their influence was stamped out by the combined efforts of the
Anglican church and the philosophical empiricists, who had been taking over
the intellectual lead from the rational Aristotelians of the former generation. We
thus see that, even though inspired movements of all kinds had been present
and even dominating throughout large parts of European cultural history, their
public influence ceased to exist almost completely after, say, 1750, at both sides
of the Channel, save for the literary credibility they retained in France. This
had immediate consequences for philosophy in its large sense. Descartes starts
his Regulae with the remark that people tend to think wrongly that they can
76L. Bianchi, Pour une histoire de la “double ve´rite´”, Vrin, Paris, 2008. See the “pre´face”
for an overview.
77J.P. Chabrol, Elie Marion, le vagabond de Dieu 1678-1713, Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, 1999.
78This Marion had been a close friend of Fatio de Duiliier, himself a close friend of Newton’s
at least until the mid 1690s. See L. Verlet, La malle de Newton, Paris, Gallimard, 1993, p.
194. Newton himself has written extensively on the intepretation of prophecy, and his method
with respect to this relates closely to the methods he developed in his scientific works. This
has been researched extensively in M. Mamiami, “To twist the meaning: Newton’s Regulae
Philosophandi revisited”, in J. Z. Buchwald and I. B. Cohen (eds.), Isaac Newtons Natural
Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass., 2001, pp. 314; id., “Newton on prophecy and the Apocalyps”,
in I. B. Cohen and G. E. Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Newton, Cambridge,
2002, pp. 387408. Accordong to Ben Chaim, Newton’s understanding of causal explanations
and experimental observation as rules that govern perceptual judgment, not as interpretation
of given phaenomena, fit in a larger scheme: His endeavour to explore and identify such rules
followed his practical reflections on human beings as agents who belonged to God’s dominion
and were created to serve its divine ends. These reflections suggested, more specifically, that
the aim of natural philosophy was the discovery of divine rules that instrumentally constrained
and facilitated human conduct. M. Ben Chaim, “The discovery of natural goods: Newton’s
vocation as an ‘experimental philosopher’ ”, BJHS, 2001, 34, p. 397. There are indeed many
good reasons to accept that the relation between early modern science and religion is far
more complicated then generally assumed. For an overview of the Newton-related material,
see S. Snobelen, “ ‘To discourse of God’: Isaac Newton’s heterodox theology and his natural
philosophy”, in P.B. Wood, (ed.), Science and dissent in England, 1688-1945, Aldershot,
Ashgate, 2004, pp. 39-65.
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conclude validly on the basis of mere similarity (“similitudo”) between things
that otherwise differ. We mentioned already that Foucault points out that the
correction of this “error” marks the transition from ancient to modern with
respect to linguistics. We showed how Arnauld and Nicole (inspired as well by
Pascal) elaborate this distinction into a full-fledged theory of representation.
From now on, “likeness”, as well as any other mental operation that involves a
leap of the imagination, has its place only in philosophy or literature, not any-
more in science. Furthermore, in the first Book of his Principiae philosophiae,
Descartes states clearly that, since we are finite beings, it would be absurd to
hope we might ever understand the infinite, and it therefore be better to not
think of it at all. He explicitly refers to mathematical problems, like whether
there are infinite lines, and whether their halves are infinite as well; whether
there are infinite numbers, and if so, whether they are even or odd, &c. In order
to solve such questions, you need to have an infinite mind. They are incompre-
hensible to us to the same extend as the mysteries of the Incarnation and of the
Trinity, which he discussed in the paragraph before. It is worthwhile to give the
full quotation:
Ita nullis unquam fatigabimur disputationibus de infinito. Nam sane,
cum simus finiti, absurdum esset nos aliquid de ipso determinari,
atque sic ilud quasi finire ac comprehendere conari. Non igitur re-
spondere curabimus iis, qui qaerunt an, si daretur linea infinita, ejus
media pars esset etiam infinita; vel an numerus infinitus sit par anve
inpar, & talia.79
For us, finite minds, when confronted with something of which we can conceive
no end, the only viable strategy is to consider it as indefinite, i.e., finite, but
without a conceivable end. In contemporary terms: all arguments we develop in
mathematics are finitary, even if they deal with ‘the infinite’.
Nos autem illa omnia, in quibus sub aliqua consideratione nullum
finem poterimus invenire, non quidem affirmabimus esse infinita,
sed ut indefinita spectabimus.80
He then gives infinite extension and the infinite divisibility of matter as exam-
ples of problems which we can only think of in “indefinite” terms. “Infinity” is
a name we can apply to God alone: tum ut nomen infiniti soli Deo reservemus
[AT VIII, I-27]. We can, however, know that there are infinite things — eternity,
God — without understanding them, because without them, it would not even
be conceivable for a finite mind to have the idea of infinity at all. In a certain
sense, our finitude points towards the infinity of God, making it accessible to our
knowledge, but keeping it far out of reach from our comprehension. There are
many other places in Descartes’s work where he varies on this basic idea. (...)
our reason, our powers of comprehension are finite and limited, and since the
79We use the Adam and Tannery edition of the Oeuvres de Descartes: AT VIII-1, I-26
80AT VIII, I-26
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will’s decisions are determined by reason, we have no, so to speak, immediate
access to infinity. We have to content ourselves with recognizing infinity without
being able to explain it [AT III 292; II 138].81 This in fact comes down to the
Aristotelian difference in degree of reality between ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ infin-
ity. The cautious attitude with respect to actual infinity was shared by Huygens
and even by Newton in his mature life.82 Pascal’s introduction of the principle of
induction in his Traite´ du triangle arithme´tique (1665), seems at first to jeopar-
dise this line of events. But evidently, to establish his induction principle, Pascal
uses arguments based on indefiniteness, not infinity, in the sense of Descartes.83
Moreover, Pascal had warned against epistemological pretenses: even though
infinities exist, they remain infinitely far beyond the limits of comprehension of
the human mind.84 So there is much more direct evidence to Descartes’s and
Pascal’s stance with regard to inifnity than the meager quotation on Descartes’s
reductionism Graham and Kantor offer on p. 36 of their book. We also see more
clearly by now in what philosophical and religious context they should be placed.
Be that as it may, according to them, this is the intellectual attitude that, al-
most three centuries later, hampered the French mathematical community in
its attempts to deal with Cantor’s set theory and its concomittant arithmetic
of infinity.85 Cantor had proven in 1873 that the set of natural numbers (the
integers) and the set of real numbers (the real line) had different kinds of infi-
nite numbers of elements, and, even more, that there is an infinite number of
infinite kinds. He then set out to check whether there are other infinities lying in
between the two arithmetical infinities, and formulated his famous Continuum
Hypothesis (CH), which basically states that this is not the case. Although he
never succeeded in proving CH — nobody ever did — he did prove in 1884
the remarkable result that CH holds for all closed subsets of the real line. This
idea of divisions of the real line had of course ancient antecedents in the para-
81See for this translation and an elaborate discussion: A. Drozdek, “Descartes: Mathematics
and Sacredness of Infinity”, Laval thologique et philosophique, 52,1, 1996.
82Once again, Newton’s attitude is peculiar and ridden with apparent inconsistencies. A case
in point is the mathematical methodology of the Principia, which is deliberately based on the
old geometrical methods, while he had his theory of fluxions already at his disposal. This
was part of an ideological agenda to ptomote “ancient wisdom” as superior over the modern
one; see J.E.Force, “Newton, the ‘Ancients” , and the ‘Moderns’ ”, in: Newton and Religion :
Context, Nature, and Influence, J. E. Force and R. H. Popkin (eds.), Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999,
pp. 237-257. The implications this had for Newton’s mathematics are brilliantly analysed in
N. Guicciardini, Reading the Principia, The Debate on Newton’s Mathematical Methods for
Natural Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, [1999].
83Poincare´ showed in his 1905 paper “Les mathe´matiques et la logique”, that complete
induction thus construed involves either a petitio principii — the set of all natural numbers —,
or a circularity — the principle of complete induction itself. The paper has been published in
several pieces and variants; I used the annotated reprint in G. Heinzmann, Poincare´, Russell,
Zermelo et Peano. Textes de la discussion (1906-1912) sur les fonde´ments des mathe´matiques:
des antinmies a` la pre´dicativite´ , Blanchard, Paris, 1986, pp. 11-54.
84Cfr. the famous passage 72 on the cirron (mite) in the Pense´es. Arnauld and Nicole
elaborate this “problem of infinity” along Pascalian lines in the first chapter of the fourth
part (“De la me´thode”) of their Logic; o.c., p. 359 sq. See also the introduction.
85 The following sketch is based on L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, Naming Infinity. A
True Story of Religious Mysticism and Mathematical Creativity, Belknap Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 2009, pp. 25-40.
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doxes of Zeno, and had been problematised before by Bolzano in his Paradoxien
des Unendlichen. Interestingly, one of the early defenders of Cantor’s work in
France was the mathematician and historian of mathematics and philosophy P.
Tannery. He introduced in the modern literature the idea that set theory and
the paradoxes appearing in it should be related to the work of Zeno.86 The
problem was pinned down accurately in 1905 by yet another prominent French
mathematician, H. Lesbesgue (of the Lebesgue integral), when he entered the
discussion on another set theoretic source of antinomies, Zermelo’s axiom of
Choice: Peut-on s’assurer de l’existence d’un eˆtre mathe´matique sans le de´finir?
De´finir veut toujours dire nommer une proprie´te´ du de´fini. This is just another
way of saying that one has to restrict mathematical notions to those which can
be clearly defined and for which a consistent mental representation is present,
requirements which sound familiar in an intellectual environment shaped by
Descartes and Port Royal...
So even though French interest in Cantor’s results was almost immediate,
it was relegated largely and for a long time to the realm of philosophy. When
three of the most noted French mathematicians decided already in 1880 that it
would be worthwhile to translate Cantor’s work, they gave the job to a Jesuit
priest, because [Cantor’s] philosophical turn of mind will not be an obstacle for
a translator who knows Kant.87 In 1898, E. Picard, an important member of the
French mathematical establishment, nearly dismissed R. Baire’s doctoral disser-
tation on discontinuous functions. Baire had, be it in a very careful way, used
concepts of set theory in the theory of functions. Evidently, such a speculative
subject witnessed the twists of a philosophical mind: L’auteur nous paraˆıt avoir
une tournure d’esprit favorable a` l’e´tude de ces questions qui sont a` la frontie`re
de la mathe´matique et de la philosophie. I take it that I do not have to explain
anymore that this was not an innocent remark, nor meant as a compliment.
Even Borel, who invented Borel sets (a way to divide the real line that has
a specific algebraic structure) and founded measure theory, and who was as a
young mathematician captivated by both the person and the work of Cantor,
declared that he had been carried away by German romanticism, and took more
distance: We are serious people; this at least is not philosophy; a disagreement
86If one renders Zeno’s two fundamental paradoxes in what I would call their canonical
form as 1) paradox of plurality: to consist of parts with and parts without magnitude, and 2)
paradox of motion: to count the uncountable, than the family resemblance with the modern set
theoretic paradoxes (Burali-Forti, Russell,...), becomes easely visible. I prsented my reading
of Zeno’s paradoxes in: K. Verelst, “Zenos Paradoxes. A Cardinal Problem. I. On Zenonian
Plurality”, in: Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects. Proceedings of the
First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Series: The Baltic
International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Vol. 1, University of Latvia
Press, Riga, 2006. For Tannery’s ideas on the subject, see P. Tannery, “Le concept scientifique
du continu. Ze´non d’Ele´e et Georg Cantor”, Revue philosophique de la France et de le´tranger,
20, 1885. One will remark that this is a philosophical, not a mathematical journal. It might
be worth considering that Tannery is (together with Charles Adam) also the editor of the
famous critical edition of Descartes’s complete works!
87The quote is on p. 30 of the Graham-Kantor book.
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can only be due to a misunderstanding.88 Cantor’s ideas had indeed flourished
in late XIX-th century romantic Germany, but even there Cantor had faced
problems throughout his career, because of the staunch opposition to his work
by an influential group of mathematicians led by L. Kronecker, who declared in
explicitly theological terms, that “God made the integers; all else is the work of
man”.89 Both Cantor and Baire suffered a nervous breakdown as a consequence
from the mental strain caused by working on such problems, as well as the bur-
den it put on the development of their respective academical careers. Cantor
ended up in a mental asylum, and Baire committed suicide, thus complying to
Meric Casaubon’s curse in one of those ironical twists history seems so fond of
to play on us.
How different the reception of these ideas was in Russia can be gauged
from the remark of a proponent of the Russian school of mathematics, which
contributed so much to their further elaboration: Everything seems to be a day-
dream, playing with symbols, which however, yield great things. This note was
not written by an exalted artist, but by one of the greatest Russian mathemati-
cians of the twentieth century, Nikolai N. Luzin. Graham and Kantor explain
this difference by the cultural influence dominant in Russia during the end of
the XIX-th and the beginning of the XX-th century. We are not going to re-
produce here in extenso their analysis — I refer to the book and the papers
already cited —, but let us summarise their conclusions, and link them to the
bigger historical context we outlined above. In the cultural realm of the Eastern
(Greek and Russian) Orthodox churches, nothing comparable to the extinction
of religious enthousiasm had happened until much later, not incidentially during
the period of Russia’s forced modernisation, started by the Czarist regime in the
second half of the XIX-th century. The use of exalted symbolism had been com-
mon practice in Orthodox liturgy for ages, e.g. in iconography, but especially
the use of the controversial “Jesus Prayer”, a ritual in which the worshipper
chants the names of Christ and God over and over again (...) until his whole
body reaches a state of religious ecstasy in which even the beating of his heart,
in addition to his breathing cycle, is supposedly in tune with the chanted words
“Christ” and “God”.90 It had roots in practices going back to fourth century
monastic hermits in the Near East, and caused already in the XIV-th century a
theological controversy with the more rationalistic Byzantine tradition. Those
practicing it were called “Name Worshippers” or “Nominalists”; those opposing
the practice “anti-Name Worshippers” or “anti-Nominalists”. The conflict came
to a climax in a politically highly sensitive period (the impending collaps of the
Ottoman Empire and the recent Menchevik Revolution) when in 1907 Ilarion, a
monk from a Russian monastery on Mt. Athos, published a very popular book
entitled In the Mountains of the Causasus, in which he claimed that the fact
88L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, “Name Worshippers. Russian religious mystics and French
rationalists: Mathematics 1900-1930”, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, vol.
LVIII, nr 3, 2005.
89E. T. Bell, Men of Mathematics, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, p. 477.
90L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, Isis-paper, p. 68.
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that the faithful can reach a state of unity with God by chanting his name
proves that the name of God is holy in itself, that the name of God is God.
Interestingly enough, he stresses that the process required to learn to do the
prayer effectively takes years and has to follow certain methodological steps.
With his claims, he provoked a line that no monotheistic theology can afford to
be trespassed, and condemnation followed swiftly, which led to the events cited
at the beginning of this section.91
Now this strand of exalted theology exerted a direct influence on the mathe-
matical developments in Russia through a former mathematician turned Ortho-
dox priest, P. Florenskii. Two of the founding members of the Moscow school of
mathematics, D.F. Egorov and N.N. Luzin, who would become leading mathe-
maticians in the twenties and thirtees with major contributions to descriptive
set theory and the theory of discontinous functions, were among Florenskii’s
disciples. Florenskii was an adept of the Name Worshippers, and he defended
his ideas on several occasions during meetings of a small circle of followers in
Egorov’s appartement. He sought to bring together mathematics and religion
through the concept of “naming”, as it had been understood by the Nominalists:
to name something was to give birth to a new entity. (...) Humans could exercise
Free Will and put in perspective mathematics and philosophy.92 Set theory was
the field par excellence wherein the mathematical power of naming came to full
fruition: discontinuity and infinity became a matter of mental creativity instead
of nervous breakdown. Luzin and Egorov were not witheld by the constraints
that halted Lebesgue. They fully developed the concept of “effective set” or
“named set”, introduced by Lebesgue in 1904 as a tool to avoid the inconve-
niences of the Axiom of Choice. According to Graham and Kantor, the birth of
descriptive set theory coincides with the moment in 1917 on which M. Suslin, a
student of Luzin’s, entered his office to show a mistake he discovered in a proof
by Lebesgue concerning projections of Borel sets on the real line. The famous
Polish topologist W. Sierpinski witnessed the scene.93 Sierpinski’s own work
would lead later on to another field infested by discontinuity and infinity, the
theory of fractals. Luzin was convinced that properly naming a mathematical
object was the key to many profound mathematical problems. We now better
understand the motto with which this paper started. Thus, Luzin’s work is the
fulfilment of the project outlined by Florenskii: the naming of sets was a math-
ematical act, just as the naming of God was a religious one, because the point
where divine and human energy meet is ‘the symbol,’ which is greater than it-
self.94
But this leaves us with a seeming paradox: In his book on the symbolic rev-
olution in XVI–XVII-th century European mathematics, M. Serfati has shown
beyond a shadow of doubt that the “de-rhetoricalisation” of mathematics and
91A tasty report on the revolt at Mt. Athos and details on the larger historical background
can be found in the first chapter of Graham and Kantor’s book.
92L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, Isis-paper, p. 70.
93L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, Isis-paper, p. 72.
94L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, Isis-paper, p. 70.
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its increasing “symbolisation” go hand in hand.95 It is nevertheless clear that
the Russian use of symbols pertains to the tradition that favours the use of
the imagination as a source of creativity, c.q., the rhetorical tradition. How can
these two conclusions regarding the use of symbols be matched? We have no in-
tention to go into this question in any detail here, but let us suggest the outlines
of a putative answer. Apparently, in the Russian case there is another source
of emancipation of the symbol at work, with a very different cultural origin.
The emancipation of the symbol is not linked to its being purified from any
pre-existing content referring to a “chose” in the sense of the early algebrists, as
described brilliantly by Serfati in his book. We suggest that, for the Russians,
symbols act like emblems, the existence of which is as much a condition for the
existence of what they “symbolise” as it is the other way around. This is con-
firmed by the way Graham and Kantor understand the Russian way to resort
to the use of symbols: Symbolism is the use of a perceptible object or activity to
represent to the mind the semblance of something which is not shown but realised
by association with it.96 Evidently, this is generally not the way we construe the
operation of mathematical symbols. We do agree, however, that this is exactly
what the Russians had in mind: nommer, c’est avoir individu. Symbols play a
different roˆle in the two approaches — the rationalistic and the imaginative one.
In the first, symbols are representations of something else, even a ‘no-thing’. In
the second, symbols are signs that not simply “re-place” something, but they
take place instead of the thing in the place of which they stand, a semiotic
rather than a semantic relation, a co-incidence rather than an arbitrary union.
The messenger in a certain sense is the master speaking out directly.97
Il faut que ce soit quelque chose de ce´leste et d’inspire´ qui intervi-
enne dans l’e´loquence pour exciter les transports et les admirations
qu’elle cherche. (...) Il est besoin de quelqu’autre que de l’art, afin
que la spe´culation se rende sensible, et qu’elle tienne ce qu’elle a
promis. Afin que les re´gles deviennent examples, afin que
la connaissance soit action et que les paroles soient des
choses.98
Conclusion
The comparative study by Graham and Kantor seems to indicate that a ‘leap of
imagination’ — in the traditional sense — is needed in order to be able to reach
out for certain kinds of formal ideas. We believe the historical research presented
in this paper confirms their findings at least to a certain extend. The roˆle of
95M. Serfati, La re´volution symbolique. La constitution de l’e´criture symbolique
mathe´matique, Pe´tra, Paris, 2005.
96L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor, Isis-paper, p. 68.
97The mechanism of the coincidence between a person preaching on supply and his master
has been studied in: A.R. Johnson, The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God,
University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1960, especially with respect to the workings of prophecy.
98J.-L. Guez de Balzac, Paraphrase ou de la grande e´loquence, cited by M. Fumaroli,
“Re´ception”, in: He´ros, p. 395.
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imagination, even when not recognised as such for want of relevant cultural
reference points, sheds another light on the tenacity of the infamous “Platonism”
which is rumoured to be so popular among practicing mahematicians, to the
despair of philosophers of mathematics and logicians alike. It might well be
that such type of conviction, no matter how flawed in itself, is a condition of
possibility for doing certain types of mathematical inquiry at all. The dual also
holds, but it remains a dual, not an inverse relationship.
Evidently, this paper is just a first and sketchy attempt to deal with this
sort of question. In this specific case in order to be complete, a detailed study
of the philosophical and rhetorical sources of orthodox Christianity is needed.
Such an inquiry required knowledge of Byzantine Greek and Slavo-Baltic lan-
guages, as well as a fine knowledge of Orthodox theology, something to which I
can not even aspire. But I hope nevertheless to have shown that there are some
remarkable parallells between sects like the “Name-Worshippers’ and the Early
Modern “enthoussiasts”. This again renders more clear why the destruction of
these enthousisast tendencies throughout the European (Contra-)Reformation
has had such marked out implications for mathematical invention and the place
of imagination in philosophy and science in general. This line of research opens
up some other interesting possibilities, like a re-assesment of the mathemat-
ics implied in the diagrammatic representations interspersed throughout the
works of Giordano Bruno, or a re-evaluation of the philosophical and theologi-
cal sources of Cantor’s ideas on infinity, developed as they were in a Germany
outliving the Romantic reaction against the excesses of Refomatory Enlighten-
ment, as well as, say, Grothendieck’s reflexions — in the first part of Re´coltes
et semailles — on “Le Reveur”, his source of inspiration, during the period of
the beat-generation and the ensuing psychedelc revolution in the West.
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